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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
San Francisco Division 
 
MUSIC GROUP MACAO COMMERCIAL 
OFFSHORE LIMITED, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
 
JOHN DOES, 
Defendant. 
 
Case No.  14-mc-80328-LB    
 
 
CORRECTED ORDER 
ON SUBPOENAS 
[ECF Nos. 1, 3, 16, 21] 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The order of January 6, 2015 (ECF No. 15)
1
 is withdrawn and this opinion is substituted in its 
place. The court denies the plaintiffs‟ motion (ECF No. 3) to transfer this subpoena-enforcement 
proceeding to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. See 
generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(f); infra, Analysis, Part I. The court grants the motion of Public 
Citizen, Inc. to file an amicus brief opposing enforcement of the plaintiffs‟ subpoenas. (ECF No. 
19.) The court thanks Public Citizen for its excellent and informative brief. The court has weighed 
Public Citizen‟s concerns in ruling on the subpoenas. The court finds this matter suitable for 
determination without oral argument and vacates the hearing that is set for March 19, 2015. See 
Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 
                                                 
1
 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 
ECF-generated page numbers at the tops of the documents. 
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 The plaintiffs seek to enforce two subpoenas against nonparty Twitter, Inc. Those subpoenas 
would compel Twitter to reveal identifying information for the anonymous Twitter users who are 
the Doe defendants. The district court for the Western District of Washington has ruled that the 
plaintiffs may obtain that information. (ECF No.2 at 30-33.) The lone substantive issue before this 
court is whether the subpoenas unduly infract the Doe defendants‟ First Amendment right to speak 
anonymously. For the reasons stated below, the court holds that the defendants‟ First Amendment 
rights outweigh plaintiffs‟ need for the requested information. See, e.g., Highfields Capital Mgmt., 
L.P. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2005). The court thus denies the plaintiffs‟ motion to 
enforce the subpoenas. See infra, Analysis, Parts II-III. 
STATEMENT 
 The underlying case is primarily one for defamation with attendant claims for copyright 
infringement, unfair competition, and breach of contract.  (See Complaint - ECF No. 2 at 5-19.) 
The plaintiffs, whom the court will collectively call “Music Group,” filed this case against John 
Doe defendants in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. (Id.) 
Music Group alleges in sum that the defendants have used anonymous accounts on the Internet 
service Twitter — under the account names @FakeUli and @NotUliBehringer — to “publish 
disparaging remarks about” Music Group, its employees, and its CEO, Uli Behringer. (ECF No. 1 
at 3.) According to Music Group, the Doe defendants have used these accounts to make 
“malicious, defamatory statements, which the [defendants] knew to be untrue”; this includes 
claiming that Music Group “designs its products to break in 3-6 months,” that Music Group 
“encourages domestic violence and misogyny,” and that the company‟s CEO, Mr. Behringer, 
“engages with prostitutes.”  (See ECF No. 1 at 7.) 
 Because the relevant Twitter accounts are anonymous, Music Group has not been able to serve 
process on the defendants. Music Group has thus subpoenaed Twitter (who is not a party to this 
suit) to reveal the identities of the @FakeUli and @NotUliBehringer users so that it can serve the 
complaint on them. More precisely, Music Group‟s subpoena would have Twitter produce “the 
name, address, email address and any proxy address” of the accounts‟ owners.  (ECF No. 1 at 3; 
ECF No. 2 at 35-39, 44-48 (subpoenas).) 
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 The Washington district court has already granted Music Group expedited discovery to 
determine the identities of the Doe defendants. (ECF No. 2 at 30-33.) The Washington court held 
that Music Group had shown “good cause” for the requested discovery.  (Id.) Given that order, 
Music Group subpoenaed Twitter for the identifying information. (ECF No. 2 at 35, 41-45.) So 
far, Twitter has not produced information in response. “Moreover,” according to Music Group, 
“although the Court in [Washington] has issued the order for early discovery, Twitter [which is 
headquartered in San Francisco] would not agree to have the Court in [Washington] decide” a 
motion to compel compliance with the subpoenas. (ECF No. 2 at 2, ¶ 5.) 
Music Group then filed this miscellaneous proceeding, asking this court to enforce the 
subpoenas. (ECF No. 1.) Twitter “takes no position on the merits” of Music Group‟s motion.  
(ECF No. 12 at 2 and n. 1.)  Twitter states only that this court must make the necessary legal 
analysis “to ensure that the appropriate First Amendment standard is met and that the [Doe 
defendants‟] right to anonymous free speech is protected.”  (Id.) Twitter also says that, if the court 
rules in Music Group‟s favor, it will respond to the subpoenas.  (Id.) 
GOVERNING LAW 
 “It is well established that the First Amendment protects the right to anonymous speech.” Art 
of Living Found. v. Does 1-10, No. 10-5022, 2011 WL 5444622, *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011) 
(citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995)). “However, the right to 
anonymity is not absolute.” Art of Living, 2011 WL 5444622 at *4. “Where anonymous speech is 
alleged to be unlawful, the speaker‟s right to remain anonymous may give way to a plaintiff‟s 
need to discover the speaker‟s identity in order to pursue its claim.” Id. 
 In In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1174-77 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth 
Circuit reviewed the developing tests in the area of anonymous online speech. Of the various 
approaches that Anonymous Online Speakers discussed, the parties urge the court to use the test 
enunciated in Highfields Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2005). “In 
choosing the proper standard to apply, the district court should focus on the „nature‟ of the 
[defendant‟s] speech . . . .” Art of Living, 2011 WL 5444622 at *5 (citing Anonymous Online 
Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1177 (“[T]he nature of the speech should be a driving force in choosing a 
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standard by which to balance the rights of anonymous speakers in discovery disputes.”) and SI03, 
Inc. v. Bodybuilding.com, LLC, 441 F. Appx. 431, 431-32 (9th Cir. 2011) (same)). 
The court agrees that Highfields is the correct standard for this case. The challenged speech 
here consists mainly of flatly derogatory statements about Music Group‟s CEO, and, apparently to 
a lesser degree, some criticism of the company‟s products that likely constitutes legitimate 
commercial criticism. The Ninth Circuit has indicated that the Highfields test is one of middling 
rigor, appropriate where, as here, the challenged speech falls somewhere beneath the most 
protected realm of “political, religious, or literary” discourse; is, in significant part, “commercial 
speech” that enjoy “lesser” protection; but may be more safeguarded than pure “fighting words 
and obscenity,” which is “not protected by the First Amendment at all.” See Anonymous Online 
Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1173, 1175-76; Art of Living, 2011 WL 5444622 at *5. 
Under Highfields, a party seeking to discover the identity of an anonymous speaker must first 
“persuade the court that there is a real evidentiary basis for believing that the defendant has 
engaged in wrongful conduct that has caused real harm to the interests of the plaintiff.” Highfields, 
385 F. Supp. 2d at 975-76. If the plaintiff makes this showing, the court must then “assess and 
compare the magnitude of the harms that would be caused to the [plaintiffs‟ and defendants‟] 
competing interests” by ordering that the defendant‟s identity be disclosed. Id. at 976. If such an 
assessment reveals that disclosing the defendant‟s identity “would cause relatively little harm to 
the defendant‟s First Amendment and privacy rights,” but is “necessary to enable [the] plaintiff to 
protect against or remedy serious wrongs,” then the court should allow the disclosure. Id. 
ANALYSIS 
I. THE COURT DENIES THE MOTION TO TRANSFER 
 Music Group has moved the court to transfer this subpoena-enforcement proceeding back to 
the Western District of Washington, the court that is hosting the underlying litigation and which 
issued the subpoenas in question. (ECF No. 3.) The court denies this motion under procedural 
Rule 45. 
 There is no question that Music Group‟s initial motion to compel Twitter to comply with the 
subpoenas is properly before this court; this is the “district where compliance [with the subpoenas] 
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is required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i). “When the court where compliance is required did not 
issue the subpoena,” as is the case here, “it may transfer a motion under this rule to the issuing 
court if the person subject to the subpoena consents or if the court finds exceptional 
circumstances” warranting the transfer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(f). “The proponent of transferring the 
motion to the issuing court bears the burden of showing „exceptional circumstances.‟” W. 
Schwarzer et al., California Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial ¶ 11:2290.1 
(Rutter Group 2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(f) advisory comm. notes to 2013 amends.) “The 
prime concern” in deciding Rule 45(f) transfer motions “should be avoiding burdens on local 
nonparties subject to subpoenas, and it should not be assumed that the issuing court is in a superior 
position to resolve subpoena-related motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(f) advisory comm. notes to 2013 
amends. 
 The court finds that no “exceptional circumstances” justify sending this motion back to the 
Western District of Washington. The court reaches this conclusion largely for the reasons that 
Twitter sets forth in opposing the transfer. (See ECF No. 11 at 2-7.) 
II. HIGHFIELDS — “REAL EVIDENTIARY BASIS” 
 The first prong of Highfields, again, requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that its claims rest on 
a “real evidentiary basis.” Highfields, 385 F. Supp. at 975-76. “It is not enough for a plaintiff to 
plead and pray. Allegation and speculation are insufficient.” Id. at 975. “[T]he plaintiff must 
adduce competent evidence” of each fact that is “essential” to “at least one of [its] causes of 
action.” Id. at 975-76 (emphasis in original). It will help to notice that, according to the Ninth 
Circuit in Anonymous Online Speakers, this is a requirement of middling rigor. More demanding 
than the “good faith” or “motion to dismiss” standard that some courts have used, the Highfields 
“real evidentiary basis” prong is less demanding than the “most exacting” test, enunciated in Doe 
v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005), which requires a plaintiff to submit “sufficient evidence” of 
each element of its claims “to survive a hypothetical motion for summary judgment” — and which 
Anonymous Online Speakers indicates is not appropriate to speech akin to that at issue here. See 
Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1175-77. 
 A prima facie defamation claim under Washington law requires a false statement that was not 
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privileged, fault, and damage. See Mohr v. Grant, 108 P.3d 768, 773 (Wash. 2005). A statement is 
defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of another by lowering him in the community‟s 
estimation or deterring third persons from associating with him. Right-Price Recreation, LLC v. 
Connells Prairie Cmty. College, 46 P.3d 789 (Wash. 2002). Damages need not be proven when a 
statement is defamatory per se. E.g., Valdez-Zontek v. Eastman Sch. Dist., 225 P.3d 339 (Wash. 
App. 2010). Defamation per se exists where a statement alleges that the plaintiff: (1) committed a 
serious crime; (2) has a loathsome disease; (3) is unchaste; or (4) conducted himself in a manner 
incompatible with his business, trade, profession, or office. Davis v. Fred’s Appliance, Inc., 287 
P.2d 51 (Wash. App. 2012); Schmalenberg v. Tacoma News, Inc., 943 P.2d 350 (Wash. App. 
1997). 
 A. The @NotUliBehringer Account 
 Under these rules, Music Group has not shown a “real evidentiary basis” for its defamation 
claim against the @NotUliBehringer user. The evidence that Music Group has submitted shows 
that this user‟s criticisms fall into two categories. The first consists of direct and indirect 
commercial criticism of Music Group‟s business practices and products. (See ECF No. 2 at 22-28.) 
This is legitimate “commercial speech” that enjoys First Amendment protection. See Highfields, 
385 F. Supp. 2d at 975 (noting protected nature of “sardonic commentary on a public corporation . 
. . through irony and parody”). “These are views in which other members of the public may well 
be interested — and that defendant has a right to express anonymously.” Id. The second group of 
comments by @NotUliBehringer are different; one comment indirectly accuses the company‟s 
CEO of tax evasion; another of traveling internationally while concealing things inside his body. 
(ECF No. 2 at 27.) The first comment is troubling, the latter merely crass. But they are both one-
time comments. Even the tax-evasion remark would likely be read as what it is: one rant among 
countless others from someone with an obvious grudge against Music Group‟s CEO. The court 
does not think that, in the eyes of an ordinary person, this one-time comment would lower the 
CEO in the community‟s estimation. Even if it would, though, as the court will discuss below — 
and reading the statement “in context,” which is “the only relevant way to view communications,” 
Highfields, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 975 — this single comment does not outweigh the defendant‟s First 
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Amendment interest in anonymous speech. 
 B. The @FakeUli Account 
 The allegations concerning @FakeUli are sterner. Music Group has shown a “real evidentiary 
basis” for claiming that the @FakeUli user‟s postings have defamed it. According to Music 
Group, the @FakeUli user has stated that Music Group intentionally designs its products to break 
within three to six months, that the company “encourages domestic violence and misogyny,” and 
that the company‟s CEO “engages with prostitutes.” (ECF No. 1 at 7.) If the first comment falls 
within the realm of legitimate commercial criticism, the last comments are plainly defamatory and 
are so per se. These comments would provide a “real evidentiary basis” for Music Group‟s 
defamation claim. The court would note, though, that Music Group can pursue only comments that 
are made about, or implicate, the company itself — and not those about its CEO, who is not a 
party to this suit. See Steam Press Holdings, Inc. v. Hawaii Teamsters and Allied Workers Union,  
Local 996, 302 F.3d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The First Amendment . . . requires that the 
challenged statement be „of and concerning‟ the complainant.” (citing New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964)). 
The one @FakeUli comment that could stand as actionably defamatory is the remark in which 
@FakeUli accuses Music Group, as a company, of encouraging “domestic violence and 
misogyny.” For purposes of this prong of the Highfields analysis, the court will assume that this 
comment can underwrite a viable defamation claim (though it is conceivable that, for reasons 
discussed below, the claim may viewed as enjoying a First Amendment “privilege” that makes it 
inactionable in defamation). The prongs of the Highfields analysis converge at this point, and the 
court will discuss this matter, below, under the First Amendment “balancing” prong of the 
Highfields test. 
III. HIGHFIELDS BALANCING — COMPARING HARMS 
 The balancing test under Highfields leads to the conclusion that the @NotUliBehringer user, 
and the @FakeUli user, can both remain anonymous. Balancing under Highfields requires the 
court to “compare the magnitude of the harms that would be caused to the [plaintiffs‟ and 
defendants‟] competing interests” by ordering that the defendant‟s identity be disclosed. 
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Highfields, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 976. “[T]he specific circumstances surrounding the speech serve to 
give context to the balancing exercise.” Art of Living, 2011 WL 5444622 at *5 (quoting 
Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1177). Furthermore, in making this assessment, the court 
must ask “whether disclosure of the defendant‟s identity would deter other critics from exercising 
their First Amendment rights.” Art of Living, 2011 WL 5444622 at *7-*8 (citing Highfields, 385 
F. Supp. 2d at 980-81).  
 A. The @NotUliBehringer Account 
 The most troubling comment that Music Group attributes to @NotUliBehringer is the indirect 
suggestion that the company‟s CEO evaded taxes. (The other comments, as the court has noted, 
amount either to legitimate, “sardonic” commercial criticism, or a one-time eruption of the 
sophomoric.) First, this comment appears to be entirely about Music Group‟s CEO, rather than the 
company itself. For reasons that straddle defamation and First Amendment law, the remark 
probably cannot serve to ground Music Group‟s own defamation claim. See Steam Press 
Holdings, 302 F.3d 998 at 1004. The court does not discount the impropriety of the tax-evasion 
charge, or how troubling it is to be the comment‟s target. But this seems to have been a one-time 
piece of snideness. Viewed “in context,” Highfields, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 975, amid the blizzard of 
invective from an obviously disgruntled person, the court is more concerned that breaching the 
defendant‟s anonymity for this single remark would unduly chill speech, and “deter other critics 
from exercising their First Amendment rights.” See Art of Living, 2011 WL 5444622 at *7. 
 B. The @FakeUli Account 
The only comment that might have justified unmasking @FakeUli’s identity is the one that 
accuses Music Group of encouraging “domestic violence and misogyny.” That comment, on its 
face and read alone, is less like legitimate commercial criticism and more like the “fighting words 
and obscenity” that “are not protected by the First Amendment at all.” See Anonymous Online 
Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1173, 1175-76. The comment is reproduced in Exhibit 2 to Music Group‟s 
underlying complaint. Music Group omitted that exhibit, apparently inadvertently, from their 
filings in this court. The court located the exhibit in the Western District of Washington‟s 
Electronic Case File. (The court thinks that this was appropriate. Music Group cited and discussed 
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Exhibit 2, but did not actually file it here. The court would have asked Music Group to file it. And 
court records, including those of other courts, are proper objects of judicial notice. See, e.g., Fed. 
R. Evid. 201(b) advisory comm. notes (judicial-notice rule covers court records); Delagarza v. 
Tesoro Ref. and Mktg. Co., 2011 WL 4017967, *18 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2011) (judicially noticing 
filings in various courts). 
The court found @FakeUli’s “domestic violence and misogyny” comment. But there was 
more to the comment than Music Group reproduced here. (The court does not mean to imply any 
misconduct by Music Group.) Immediately following the words “domestic violence and 
misogyny” is a shortened URL. That URL is home to a short video, a comedic ad promoting one 
of Music Group‟s products: a roughly briefcase-sized metal box that is apparently an audio mixer. 
In the commercial — a domestic tableau not unreminiscent of early Mike Leigh — a woman tries 
to convince a man to leave their house for a social affair. He ignores her; he is too busy using his 
Music Group mixer. Growing irate, she begins to hurl things at him. He blocks these seriatim with 
his mixer, which the commercial‟s title indicates is “Bulletproof.” He first blocks a coffee mug, 
then a wine bottle, then a chef‟s knife. Finally, emotions in crescendo and denouement surely at 
hand, she raises a gun and fires — only to be struck by the ricochet off the impregnable mixer. 
The hapless woman falls dead, and hammily. Falls, too, the curtain. 
The point is that the video is comedic. (Whether funny or not is another question.) In this 
context, there is no way to see @FakeUli’s comment as anything other than joking and ironic. It 
does not fall outside the First Amendment for being in poor taste. 
CONCLUSION 
The court denies Music Group‟s motion to enforce the @NotUliBehringer and @FakeUli 
subpoenas. The court also denies Music Group‟s motion to transfer this proceeding to the Western 
District of Washington. 
 This disposes of ECF Nos. 1, 3, 16, and 21. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: March 2, 2015 
LAUREL BEELER 
United States Magistrate Judge 
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